

1. Problem: To improve the relations existing between OPC and the Armed Forces.

2. Background. OPC was created to fill a long recognized need in the governmental structure. It is the only agency which in itself embraces the entire gamut of political-psychological-economic and physical action. A new agency, it is in the process of establishing itself. Until it wins its spurs it will not gain the confident support of older services. Unfortunately, OPC has to overcome the obstacle that it began engaging in operations before a concept of unconventional operations had been established or a sound organization formed.

3. The Armed Services, especially the Army, have long paid lip service to the efficacy of OPC-type operations, but they have not until recently taken any practical steps to develop this interest. Soviet proficiency in unconventional warfare has been primarily responsible for increased military interest. Many officers see its potentialities and wish to see the services dominate it. Soviet proficiency in unconventional warfare, however, stems from the fact that the Politburo, in some respects the Soviet OPC, is at the apex of the Soviet system and not buried down in the Soviet hierarchy. Under the Soviet concept, military, psychological, economic and unconventional operations all receive integrated political direction from the very top of the Soviet system. Such an arrangement is manifestly impossible in the U. S. Unconventional operations, however, to be effective, must receive both political and military guidance and be conducted by men with some competence in both military and political affairs.

4. The peacetime

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4. The peacetime status of OPC does provide for both political and military guidance, although the organization has thus far been weighted more with men possessing political than military competence.

5. Existing concepts of U.S. wartime organization provide for OPC to come under military command. The net result of this arrangement will be to place quasi-political-quasi-military operations under military direction. A somewhat comparable Soviet arrangement would be for the Politburo to come under the command of the Soviet Army.

6. Unconventional warfare has been dubbed the Fourth Force, yet in actual practice it is regarded as a minor subsidiary element by orthodox military commanders. This fact has created a reluctance on the part of OPC to be completely absorbed within the military structure.

7. OPC activities are of interest to all the Armed Services, yet each of them have developed their interest in a piecemeal fashion. For example, there are separate studies for promoting the defection of various categories of Soviet military personnel; there are separate offices charged with developing psychological warfare.

8. Against this general background specific sources of friction between OPC and the Armed Forces should be stated.

9. Military Objections to OPC

a. That it will follow in the footsteps of OSS and become a boondoggling operation of little importance in the prosecution of a war.

b. That it

b. That it has very low capabilities in the paramilitary field and has been extremely slow in developing more.

c. That it has not developed any strategic concept for the integration of its activities with normal military operations.

d. That many of its personnel have only a rudimentary knowledge of military procedures.

e. That it has failed to take a clear cut position with regard to specific military proposition involving its employment.

f. That it appears to be adverse to planning and conducting its operations in a systematic fashion.

g. That some individuals in OPC are antipathetic to military personnel.

#### 10. OPC Objections to the Military

a. Military approach to unconventional warfare is too conventional and orthodox.

b. Military approach to development of resistance forces too mechanical.

c. The military overlook the fact that the utilization of indigenous forces involving many complicated techniques and safeguards, that these are technical problems comparable to artillery, air support, or other purely military problems.

d. Military have too little respect for a field of warfare in which the (American) military have shown little competence.

e. Military are not sensitive to political and psychological factors which necessarily play an important role in unconventional warfare.

f. Military are generally unaware of political considerations involved in guerrilla warfare.

11. Can OPC Improve Situation?

- a. By developing a clear concept of our mission.
- b. By concrete evidence that we are strengthening our organization and our ability to do our job -- especially in the field of paramilitary warfare.
- c. By cutting in operational and logistical planners in the Pentagon on the fact that OPC exists and should be considered in every aspect of their planning.
- d. By developing working level liaison with military planners.
- e. By giving careful consideration to military propositions in the unconventional warfare field.
- f. By joint covert planning with the theaters.

  
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